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* * * 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Let’s kick off our concurrent session on Patent Potpourri. The 
difference between this and “Patents—Past, Present and Future” or other patent panels is 
that we are the best-smelling one. [Laughter] 
Without further ado, I’m going to start. We’re going to go down the line here. We 
will kick off with Myles. 
Myles, take us away. 
DR. JELF: What we have this morning is international patent exhaustion in seven 
minutes or less. I’m conscious that Sir Robin Jacob dealt with this yesterday1 and he did it 
in slightly over seven minutes, so this is a record attempt. Excuse me if I may paraphrase 
slightly some of the specifics of the law. 
The fundamental point I want to address is the fact that we have different systems 
globally for addressing the issues raised by exhaustion. My thesis is going to be that the 
way those different systems interact with each other is particularly difficult. They form a 
rather toxic mix for businesses that have to practice on a global basis. 
The first point is I’m not going to get bogged down in the doctrine or terminology. 
The fundamental issue here is sometimes talked about as “exhaustion,” sometimes as 
“implied license,” or a question of “waiver.” I think that fundamentally there is the same 
issue at the heart of all of those. It’s a question of consent and it’s a question of if you have 
sold somebody something or granted them a license to do certain things with a purchased 
product in certain circumstances, to what extent can you later restrict what they do with the 
product that you’ve sold to them. 
Why do courts care about this? Well, ultimately it’s a question of fairness. There 
is an entirely respectable line of thought that says: “If I’ve bought something, I own it 
outright, the property has been transferred to me. Why should there be any constraints on 
what I subsequently do with that property?” 
I’m going to simplify things and say that there are two different philosophical 
approaches to how we deal with that question of fairness. 
An aside before we get to the specifics of those two approaches is that obviously 
different systems in the world take different approaches to many different issues. As a 
foreign lawyer, generally you see what’s done abroad and one’s first instinct is Well that’s 
just mad! And then you sort of see it in the round and realize there are checks and balances 
so that what may seem mad in fact works in the context of the whole system. 
The problem we have here is because of the international ramifications of 
exhaustion, the checks and balances of one system, whilst consistent internally, cause 
problems with the “checks and balances” of other systems. 
 
1 See Session 1A: Key Current IP Issues: Reflections & Analysis, EMILY C. & JOHN E. 
HANSEN INTELL. PROP. INST. FORDHAM L. SCH. (2019). 
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A very quick, lightning tour of the law, a précis. 
There are two flavours/flavors (depending on how your spellcheck is set up): 
geographic restraints and field-of-use restraints. I’m going to broadly deal with these by 
saying these are dealt with in two different ways — this is very broad-brush — there is the 
way the United States does it and then I am going to, very unfairly, say there is the way 
everybody else does it. 
The United States Supreme Court in the Lexmark2 case takes a relatively extreme 
view and says as soon as you put something on the market anywhere, then your rights in 
terms of patents are exhausted for all purposes; a U.S. patent is no longer of any use to 
restrain any further dealing or commercialization of the product. If the patentee wants to 
have post-sale restrictions, that’s fine, there’s no fundamental problem with that, but they 
need to organize that contractually. 
I am going to talk primarily about the EEA/EU now — and again this is already a 
generalization because there is no harmonization even within the European Union about 
exhaustion, but in my experience the jurisdictions I have looked at have a broadly similar 
approach. 
Field of use is slightly different from geographical restrictions: as long as it is 
clearly understood by the purchaser what they are buying and what restrictions they are 
buying and that is communicated and passed down the chain, then restricting activities 
outside that permission is not a problem; you haven’t exhausted things.  
Geographically, it is slightly more complex. For extra-EEA restrictions that is 
generally also true; you can restrict sales to China or to Malaysia or wherever you want. 
However, within the EEA you cannot restrict geographically; once something is sold in 
one Member State it cannot be restrained within another geographically. You can restrain 
on a field-of-use basis, however, crucially, the nature of those restrictions, both in terms of 
the license scope and in terms of any contractual provisions, is quite tightly controlled by 
European antitrust law. 
I am going to illustrate the way that those two global approaches cause problems 
with a case study.  
• Two companies, A and B, are each trading worldwide in components for gas 
cookers.  
• Both have significant patent portfolios and they think the other is infringing their 
portfolios. 
• Each has a different customer base. One deals primarily with domestic 
applications and the other with commercial applications. 
At the moment, because of this fear that they may have an issue in the future, both 
are spending a lot of time and money on patent issues. Their filing policy is intense, trying 
to match what is being done on the other side. They are filing European Patent Office 
oppositions. They are filing inter-partes reviews (IPRs) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office. Both are spending a lot of time and effort on potential patent conflict. 
But they realize there is no commercial conflict between them, so they would quite 
like to have a coexistence agreement that says: “I am not going to pursue you if you are 
selling into commercial; you don’t pursue me for selling into domestic. We can stop 
spending all this money on patent lawyers” — which apparently is a good thing; I’m not 
sure about that. 
 
2 Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017).  
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However, EU antitrust law says that you cannot just have a contract saying “you 
take these customers and I will take those customers” — because that violates a whole 
bunch of principles — “however, what we can do is draw up reciprocal licenses that are 
restricted in scope, and then if something turns up as one of your products being used in a 
commercial application, I can still bring a patent action; if one of my products turns up in 
a domestic application, you can bring a patent action. Within our respective spheres 
everybody is happy.” 
The problem comes up that now we have to factor in the fact that these products 
are being dealt with worldwide and they will turn up in the United States. Under Lexmark, 
that restriction on the field of use is completely unenforceable. As soon as the product has 
gone into the marketplace, the U.S. patents can no longer be used to police the license 
agreement. 
The parties try to follow what the Supreme Court indicated in Lexmark: if you want 
to have post-sale deals, you have to do that contractually; each is content to say, “I will 
only sell into the domestic market; you will only sell into the commercial market.” 
But what about onward sales beyond these two? Also, how does A police what has 
happened with B’s customers? 
So the parties say, “Okay, let’s have a chain of contracts. My contract with my 
customers will say ‘when you sell anything further down you will impose the same 
obligation; and I will make you a third-party beneficiary to all this so you can police it 
directly.’” 
Unfortunately, they then realize that neither has any visibility of what the other’s 
sales and distribution mechanisms are. So, unlike the patent context where if A sees 
products turning up being used commercially they can bring a patent action, if the breach 
is contractual, when they see those products turning up, they don’t know where the fault 
lies in the chain of contracts; they don’t know whether it was that party or somebody 
upstream. So it is much more difficult for them to enforce even with third-party rights. 
So then they say: “Okay, we’ll have a register and I’ll tell you where my products 
are going and you tell me where your products are going and we can see when things go 
wrong.” Unfortunately, that violates the EU antitrust laws again. That is sharing sensitive 
customer information. 
The conclusion of this is a philosophical clash between the way that the United 
States is dealing with that potential unfairness (which is patent rights are no good; do 
everything by contract) versus the way the EU States do it (which is contractual market 
divisions are difficult to arrange but we are happy for you to have partial licenses) — the 
clash between those two makes it very difficult for a business operator on a global basis. 
Which brings me to the conclusion that Sir Robin came to yesterday, that it would 
be great if we could get people together and try to have a more holistic solution across the 
globe. 
Thank you very much. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: I want to emphasize that I’m not doing introductions with all 
the accolades and titles that everyone acquires — it’s a bit like Game of Thrones — after a 
certain point with the length of their titles. But embrace our Internet and Google if you 
want to know about all of their great achievements, or just look in the old-school dead-tree 
book that was provided by Hugh and the conference organizers. 
Ken, do you have any reactions or comments to Myles’s presentation on 
exhaustion? 
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MR. ADAMO: Yes. As is typical when you’ve got hypotheticals, his hypothetical 
is not real-world. We are getting along quite well in the United States now that we know 
what the law is, thanks to our nine wise men and women on the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
we are using contracts to get us around the problem quite readily. Label licenses still work. 
Contracts work. It’s an interesting hypothetical, but this ain’t law school. 
DR. JELF: The only thing I’ll say in response to that, Ken, is that was a real 
example. I spent three months trying to negotiate those contracts and it couldn’t be done in 
the end. 
MR. ADAMO: Well, you’ve just got to hire an aggressive, nasty America lawyer. 
We get it done between each other. You Europeans are too damn nice. Come on! 
DR. JELF: That is true. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: And by “aggressive, nasty lawyer” you mean Ken? [Laughter] 
MR. ADAMO: No. Mr. Dunner will speak for me. I haven’t got an aggressive bone 
in my body.  
PROF. MOSSOFF: Excellent. 
Aloys Hüttermann, will you kick us off with the next presentation? 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: I’m going to use Myles’s trick if I have to. When the bomb 
goes off, I’ll say, “I’m almost there” and talk for another five minutes. I hope that this is 
not necessary. 
I am going to speak about a completely internal EPO issue, but this is at the 
moment the hottest issue at the EPO. This is Decision T 1063/18.3  
What is this all about? What did it say? For the first time ever a Technical Board 
of Appeal of the EPO declared Rule 28 (2) of the European Patent Convention invalid in 
view of earlier decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, which is something like the 
supreme court of the European Patent Office, except that usually most of their decisions 
make sense. 
There is a background to it. Article 53 of the European Patent Convention4 says 
that process claims related to essentially biological methods are not patentable. 
The question is: what happens with products of these process claims; are they 
patentable as such or not? 
In 2015 the Enlarged Board of Appeal, in two conciliated procedures (G2/12+ 
G2/13, “Tomatoes II” and “Broccoli II”),5 said: yes, they are principally patentable; the 
eligibility is only for the process; the products as such can be patented. 
This caused quite a stir one has to say. At first, Germany and Netherlands changed 
their national patent laws. According to German patent law, now these products (usually 
plants) are not patentable. 
Then the European Union became active. The European Parliament asked the 
European Commission for an opinion whether this ruling would be covered by the 
Biopatent Directive — what happens now? The Commission issued a Notice in November 
20166 that said that it was the intention of the drafters of the Biopatent Directive, where all 
this comes from, that also products of such essentially biological processes should be not 
patentable.   
 
3 Decision T 1063/18, ECLI:EP:BA:2018:T106318.20181205 (Dec. 5, 2018).  
4 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268.  
5 Decisions G 2/12 and G 2/13, ECLI:EP:BA:2015:G000212.20150325 (Mar. 25, 2015). 
6 2016/C 411/03, (Nov. 2016). 
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In reaction, the Administrative Council of the EPO became active and in July 2017 
introduced a new rule, Rule 28(2), in which they said that products which are made out of 
essentially biological processes are not patentable.  
In the meantime, of course applicants were active. Syngenta had filed a 2012 
application (priority 2011) on pepper plants, EP 2 753 168, which in March 2018 was 
refused (solely) for violating Rule 28(2). 
I should say that in the meantime the prosecution of all these applications was 
halted, so for some years this actually wasn’t prosecuted.  
Finally, in March 2018, the Examining Division said, “This not patentable because 
we have Rule 28(2).  
Syngenta appealed. The hearing was in December 2018, so not so long ago. The 
case was decided by an Enlarged Panel of the T 3.3.04 (five instead of the usual three 
members because of the importance of the case). The Board decided that Rule 28(2) would 
violate the interpretation of Article 53(b) by the Enlarged Board of Appeal: We have the 
ruling of the Enlarged Board of Appeal that those products — “a cultivated blocky fruit 
type pepper plant” (paprika) — as such must be patentable because the ruling of the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal must prevail and Rule 28(2) is not applicable, period. But they 
saw a problem with inventive step and also with clarity. So the case was sent back to the 
Examining Division to deal with that.  
This of course caused a stir especially with the Member States which are in the 
Administrative Council. The EPO President became active on 5 April 2019 and initiated a 
referal to the EBA, which has been given the number G 3/19. The questions referred to the 
EBA are whether Rule 28 could be issued even though there was the earlier G 2/12+ G2/13; 
and, if yes, if Rule 28 was an allowable interpretation of Article 53 EPC. Again, the 
prosecution of all corresponding applications that fell under that was stayed, too. 
If the referral is not successful, some important Member States of the 
Administrative Council have announced that they will then just pull the plug and simply 
change the European Patent Convention. How could you do that without a Diplomatic 
Conference? It is possible because, according to Article 33 of the EPC, the Administrative 
Council can change part of the Convention “to bring it into line with an international treaty 
relating to patents or European Community legislation relating to patents.” They obviously 
are of the opinion that this notice has enough substance to do that. 
Three final questions.  
First, if the European Patent Convention is not changed, will this lead to more 
patents? Here I must say no, not necessarily. What we actually have here is a classical shift 
of eligibility to inventive step as product-by-process claims before the EPO have a high 
threshold to pass inventive step. The rulings G2/13+G2/13 follow the line of the EPO to 
shift eligibility problems to inventive step. In case you speak German, there is an 
interesting article from 2012 [Hüttermann / Storz: Nicht Erschießen sondern Erhängen – 
Zur stetig zunehmenden Rolle der erfinderischen Tätigkeit bei der Beurteilung der 
Schutzfähigkeit von Patenten, Mitt. dr. Patentanw. 2012, 107–110] which I recommend 
you read 
The trend that the EPO has is to avoid eligibility problems; instead they put it to 
inventive step. It can be that none of these patents is issued because they are simply not 
inventive. 
If they would be granted, would they be invalid in Germany and the Netherlands? 
In all likelihood yes. 
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Did the Board have the right to overrule the Administrative Council? That is in 
question. The Board concluded this from an obiter dictum of an earlier decision (T 39/93)7 
but that is not a definitive ruling. Hopefully, the referral will lead to more clarity. 
Last but not least, we do have a German constitutional complaint about the 
independence of the Board. I hope that our Bundesverfassungsgericht takes all of this into 
account because this clearly does not speak for any over-obedience of the Boards 
concerning the decisions of the Administrative Council and the President. 
Thank you. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Distinguished panelists and additional commentators, any 
reactions to how patent eligibility issues have now prompted a large-scale institutional and 
government crisis? 
QUESTION [Maximilian Haedicke, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg]: When 
I was at Georgetown many years ago doing my LLM, I heard about a case called Marbury 
v. Madison.8 My understanding of this case is that it was about the separation of powers in 
the U.S. Constitution and the role of the Supreme Court. 
I think that we have a very similar issue at the EPO right now because the question 
is whether the Administrative Council can make rules which are in contradiction with 
former Board of Appeals decisions. I think we are at a very critical point for the EPO right 
now. It needs to be decided how the rule of law works in the EPO, how the separation of 
powers works, and whether the Administrative Council has all the power in the EPO system 
and how far it can be controlled by the Enlarged Board of Appeal. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Thank you. 
QUESTION [Trevor Cook, WilmerHale]: I was interested in your reference to 
Article 33 of the EPC and changing parts of the Convention to bring them into line with 
European Community legislation related to patents. I would be very interested in your 
thoughts about the status of that Commission Notice because it is merely a Commission 
interpretation of the travaux préparatoires and does not to my mind have the force of law. 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: To come back to Max’s comments and also to yours, I 
think this is a very interesting decision because it goes way beyond the special field of 
patents; it goes really to who has the final say in what. 
I hope — this is my personal view — that, although there may be admissibility 
problems, the referral of the President will be accepted. In my opinion, the Board in this 
case should have referred the case to the Enlarged Board of Appeal in order to ask, let’s 
say, who prevails. 
I agree with you, Trevor. The thing is that the Member States are not happy with 
this ruling, period, and they want to get rid of it. 
At the moment we do have a compromise. Initially, there were rumors that the 
Administrative Council or the Member States who form that would simply go for an 
amendment of the EPC straightaway. But then they said, “Okay, we’ll first let the President 
handle it internally because the legal basis is creative.” But simply that is what they want, 
period. 
One has to wait to see what comes out of that. I personally hope that the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal will take on the case. Even if they have admissibility problems, there is 
the G 3/08 decision,9 which was about computer-implemented inventions, where they said, 
 
7 Decision T 39/93, ECLI:EP:BA:1996:T003993.19960214 (Feb. 14, 1996). 
8 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
9 Decision G 3/08, ECLI:EP:BA:2010:G000308.20100512 (May 12, 2010).  
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“Oh, all of this is not admissible but …” and then they at length answered all the questions 
that were posed to them. 
I hope that in the case they have admissibility problems, which probably are there, 
they still will give answers about who is in charge and how the balance is between the 
different organs, here the Enlarged Board of Appeal and the Executive. That would be 
good, I think. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: I’m wanting to keep us moving along so that we stay on track. 
We’ll have more time for questions and answers towards the end as well where you can 
ask any questions of all the speakers. 
Our next speaker is Tobias Hahn. 
MR. HAHN: Moving on in the Potpourri session, I will try to relate the issues we 
have decided to discuss. In a very broad sense I’m also talking about, maybe not separation 
of powers, but a jurisdiction issue. 
The starting point is German case law on liability under German patent law for 
acts of infringement that are actually conducted abroad, not on German territory. In a way, 
that raises in the broad sense similar issues. But that shall only be the starting point. If 
possible, I would like to have a discussion on possible other tendencies of national courts 
trying to extend their jurisdiction. When I say “jurisdiction” I’m not referring to jurisdiction 
in a narrow sense, because I think a lot of these are not jurisdiction issues as such, but they 
show a certain tendency for courts to decide cases that they may have rejected to decide on 
in the past. 
The cases on liability for acts actually done abroad arise in two categories, direct 
and indirect infringement. I will be focusing on direct infringement because the principles 
are more or less the same and I want to save you the nitty-gritty details of German case law 
in indirect infringement. It’s all in the slides, so if you want to visit that you can do that 
later on. 
I will start with cases where, from the German point of view, we actually do not 
have acts abroad but acts in Germany when it comes to direct infringement. So you have 
offering or putting on the market as the main key aspects or the main key acts of 
infringement. 
Offering, I think it is important to note to start with, takes place in German territory 
if either the sender or the receiving location of the offer is in Germany, which means that 
Internet offers as long as they are also directed to German customers are considered an act 
of infringement in Germany. The same applies for exhibition of products and offering of 
products at trade fairs as long as they are in German territory. 
For the putting on the market or the actual supply of the product, it is important to 
note that this is not only an offer from Germany to abroad but also that in case you have a 
supply from abroad to German territory and that is already considered “putting on the 
market” in the German territory. 
What are the cases that do not fall under these categories directly? 
One of these cases is a 2003 case, the Radio Clock I (Funkuhr) decision.10 What 
were the facts of the case? 
There was a defendant who was located abroad producing the infringing radio 
clocks, and he supplied the products not to a customer in Germany but to a customer also 
abroad, and that intermediate then sold the products into German territory. So, different to 
 
10 Mitt 2002, 416.  
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the cases we’ve just discussed, the defendant did not conduct all infringing acts on German 
territory. 
What did the Supreme Court say? In effect, they attributed the acts of the 
intermediate to the defendant, and as a requirement for such attribution the Supreme Court 
stipulated that if the supplier of the product knows both the patent and the infringement 
allegation as well as the country of destination — in other words, if he supplies the products 
to an intermediate and knows that that intermediate will carry on selling these products on 
German territory — then the direct infringing acts of the intermediate can be attributed to 
the defendant, to the supplier of the product, even though he does not conduct himself any 
acts on German territory. 
Other facts, like whether there is cooperation between the supplier and the third 
party — such as, for example, a parent and a subsidiary — do not matter; the knowledge 
itself creates liability under German Patent Law. 
That was taken further in Abdichtsystem,11 a rather recent decision of 2017, where 
it was held that you actually do not necessarily even need knowledge, but there is what I 
would phrase liability for negligence. 
The idea construction is as follows. You may also take part in the infringement on 
German territory if you have an obligation not to promote third-party infringement.  
Now, the big question is, of course, what gives rise to that obligation not to promote 
third-party infringement. The Supreme Court said there must be specific indications of 
infringement in Germany. In other words, in our case where the supplier supplies the 
product to an intermediate also located abroad, if there have been specific indications that 
these products will be carried on, inter alia, to Germany, then there may also be liability 
under German Patent Law. 
The big question is, of course, what are the specific indications. The easy case is 
positive knowledge because that has been established in the previous decision. But there 
may also be other indications that the Supreme Court had mentioned, for example, if the 
number of products ordered by far exceed the demand of the market where the intermediate 
is located; so you must be aware of the fact that these products will also end up in Germany. 
Or, alternatively, there is an obvious correlation between the order on the one hand and the 
activity of the intermediate on the German market. 
What specific circumstances may qualify as the specific indications I think remains 
to be seen, but it is important that the knowledge requirement is not as such necessary under 
this construction but you have some sort of negligence that may already suffice for liability 
under German Patent Law. 
To sum it up, what are the key takeaways? The strategy obviously following from 
this is make your intermediate that you want to sue aware of your patent and aware of the 
fact that if these products end up in Germany, or entirely in Germany, which then creates 
knowledge, you would be able to sue the supplier himself and not only the intermediate for 
patent infringement in Germany. 
To put this in a broader scale, I think this is one example of national courts — I 
wouldn’t say extending jurisdiction because they’re not extending jurisdiction; they are 
applying the law as it is — but I see this case law development in a similar line as, for 
example, in the United Kingdom in the Unwired Planet case,12 where the U.K. courts felt 
competent to determine FRAND rates on a worldwide basis. Again, I don’t think it is a true 
 
11 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], May 16, 2017, Abdichtsystem, 
Case No. X ZR 120/15 (Ger.).  
12 [2018] UKSC 2018/0214 (U.K.). 
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jurisdiction issue, but I think it shows a similar development of the U.K. courts deciding 
issues that they may not have decided on in the past because they would have felt they 
probably do not have jurisdiction or should not do so. 
I would be interested also in hearing from the audience whether there are certain 
other developments in other jurisdictions. 
Thank you very much. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Thank you. 
DR. WATTS: Would you welcome, on the basis of this jurisdiction, courts 
elsewhere — let’s say in the United Kingdom, or perhaps China or elsewhere — on the 
basis that the harmful act that is being held to infringe a German patent is happening in 
their own territory, adjudicating declarations of noninfringement of the German patent by 
acts that are happening in the United Kingdom or China or anywhere else? 
If you have an international jurisdiction that says an action outside of Germany is 
infringing, I can’t see why the determination of that infringement shouldn’t take place in 
the court where the act is happening. 
MR. HAHN: I think the answer is twofold. I do not see anything barring the U.K. 
court from declaring noninfringement if it finds that there is noninfringement. I think the 
big question is, does that have any binding effect on other national courts like the German 
court?  
I think the answer is clearly no because that is a true jurisdiction issue. But it may 
be a way for parties to sort out their dispute in regard to the action that would then be 
litigated in Germany by being actually taken abroad. But, as I said, I do not think it is a 
true jurisdiction issue because the way that the German courts construe it is that it is 
attributing an act that has relevance for the German patent, attributing that to another party 
that in some way or the other contributes to it. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: First, I want to ask if Shlomo or Ken have any reactions. 
MR. ADAMO: I don’t. 
DR. COHEN: The issue of contributory infringement always raises interesting 
controversies, especially in an international setting. But I would say there is nothing much 
new in the idea that contributory infringement can occur outside the jurisdiction. 
What you will need to do, as I understand these German cases have concluded, is 
connect the acts outside the jurisdiction to the impact in the jurisdiction. In that respect I 
think there is a pretty substantial body of laws in several jurisdictions to that effect. 
QUESTIONER [Tobias Bremi, Isler & Pedrazzini AG and the Swiss Federal 
Patent Court, Zurich]: You gave a nice piece of advice for the position of the patentee. 
What would be your advice for the, I presume, Italian supplier who sells his products? How 
can he avoid presumed knowledge? Is it sufficient, for example, to inform his French 
distributor “You are not entitled to sell that to Germany?” — is that sufficient, even if later 
on you realize he’s not sticking to that suggestion? That would be interesting for me. 
MR. HAHN: My personal view on this is that you can’t really avoid it. There may 
be certain steps of escalation. It may be enough in the first step for you to interrogate your 
customer to determine whether he intends to supply the products also to the German 
market. But I think you can’t evade it once you have been made aware of it; you are aware 
of the fact that these products are being sold on German territory as well, and then you are 
within contributory infringement. 
So in the end I don’t think there’s a way out of it. Quite frankly, if you are aware 
of the fact that your products end up, inter alia, on the German market, then probably you 
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should be liable under German Patent Law for infringement of the German patent or the 
German part of a European Patent. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Aloys. 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: The problem here is that both companies are competitors 
but their client was like a big automotive company, and you just don’t sue them, period. 
So they had to find a way to get them sued without really suing their actual client. I think 
the Italian company is doomed. If you get an order from a big automotive company, then 
they want to be free to sell that everywhere. There’s nothing you can do about it. 
QUESTION [Judge Klaus Grabinski, Federal Court of Justice, Karlsruhe]: I think 
it’s very easy. As soon as you are aware that in this case this Italian intermediate is selling 
products in Germany where it is patent-infringing, you have to stop supplying this 
intermediate. That is as easy as it gets. 
You were not liable before because you were not aware of the situation when you 
were doing the first deliveries, but once you have been made aware of the patent infringing 
acts in Germany, of course, you have to stop supplying the patent infringer.  
QUESTION [Joachim Feldges, Allen & Overy]: I see where this is coming from, 
but I have some concerns about the effect of looking at that in an isolated manner from the 
German perspective. You intervene then also with international commercial relationships, 
you request stopping from supplying entirely, and that has an impact on competition also 
beyond the question of an infringement of a German patent. 
I think some more, let us say, understanding of what the impact of such case law 
is also beyond what is legitimate under German patent protection would be helpful. My 
concern is that it is reaching too far if you only look at this aspect. 
MR. HAHN: Just two words: design around it. That would be my answer. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: This is great. Thank you. 
If anyone else has any questions, hold them. We’ll have time towards the end to 
continue the conversation. 
Among the wonderfully perfumed topics that we are covering on our panel we’ll 
continue with infringement doctrines with Justin.  
DR. WATTS: Thank you.  
Well, perfumed is one thing. But the other thing about potpourri is it’s dry, it’s of 
no practical use, and it’s best kept in the cupboard. So I’m going to talk about the doctrine 
of equivalents. [Laughter] We are going to go back, if I can, for a bit of history and to place 
it in context. 
I will start off with Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,13 in which Lord 
Hoffmann held that the correct approach to the scope of claims was “purposive 
construction” and differentiated that from the doctrine of equivalents, which he said really 
has no place in English law. Although it’s fair to say, if you are going to be dealing with 
infringement by variants and you are commenting on how variants infringe, I do find it a 
little odd not to regard that in itself, as it were, as a doctrine of equivalents. 
But be that as it may, twelve years later Kirin-Amgen was deprecated and the 
doctrine of equivalents expressly welcomed into English law courtesy of Lord Neuberger 
in Actavis UK v. Eli Lilly.14 He held that there are two requirements for analysis of 
infringement now:  
• First, do the variants infringe as a matter of “normal interpretation,” which, in 
subsequent cases, has been said to be purposive infringement, although when I go through 
 
13 [2005] RPC 9 (U.K.). 
14 [2017] UKSC 48 (U.K.), [2017] RPC 21 (U.K.). 
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some of those cases you will see that purposive construction is no longer really what the 
courts are doing? 
• Second, if it does not infringe as a matter of normal interpretation, does it 
nonetheless infringe because it differs in a way that is immaterial? He went on to expand 
what “immaterial” means.  
By the way, all the cases I mention on are the first slide and the references are there 
if you want to look them up later. 
The Actavis test has three stages: 
• First: does the variant achieve the same result in the same way? 
• Second: would that be obvious to a person skilled in the art knowing that the 
variant achieves the same result, that it does it in the same way? So that is giving the person 
skilled in the art knowledge of the variant and asking him does it work in the same way. 
• Third: does the reader of the patent nonetheless conclude that strict compliance 
is required with the literal meaning of the claims? 
Now, some fears were expressed that Actavis was going to open floodgates of new 
litigation, but actually it took fifteen months before the first case was reported that you 
might think turned on the new doctrine.  
That was the Icescape v. Ice-World case.15 Lord Justice Kitchin, now Lord Kitchin, 
approached the variant in that case by identifying what he said was the “core invention.” 
The claim had a number of integers that specified in particular that the components 
concerned, which were pipes, needed to be connected in series; and the variant was to 
connect them in parallel. It was common ground that that was a difference of some 
significance because in some ways there were advantages in connecting them in parallel. 
But the court nonetheless held that the core invention had been used, the core invention 
wasn’t concerned with the series part of the claim, and consequently the claim was 
infringed even though the specification in the claim, that the pipes be connected in series, 
was not what was done. 
Now, on the final question, whether strict compliance was required, the court 
approached that first by deciding that series connection was not part of the core invention. 
It concluded that that in itself implied that compliance with the requirement of series 
connection was not necessary and would not be understood to be necessary. 
The conclusion in Actavis and Icescape, I would say, leaves little room in cases 
where the third question might be thought to be determinative. 
The second question also is hardly likely to arise in real-world cases, certainly not 
outside of the pharmaceutical sector, since it presupposes that the expert knows the solution 
and the question is whether he is unable to determine how it works. For mechanical cases 
I would say that is a very unlikely scenario, and in electronic cases too; these are 
technologies where experts who know what the solution is will almost inevitably be able 
to determine how it works. There may be cases in pharma where the second question will 
make a difference. 
So an awful lot of real-world cases are going to turn on whether the variant 
achieves the same result in the same way. That then comes down to a question of 
determining what the court thinks “result in the same way” means and, therefore, what the 
core invention is. Some subsequent cases have looked at this, and it’s quite instructive to 
see how they have approached it. 
 
15 [2018] EWCA Civ 2219 (U.K.). 
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The first is Regen Lab v. Estar Medical.16 This and the following cases are all from 
the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC), the junior court in the United Kingdom, 
and His Honor Judge Hacon. 
The claim in Regen Lab said you needed a polyester gel and a molarity under 0.1. 
The judge said the accused product didn’t have the required polyester gel, and had a 
molarity of 0.136, so it was also outside the numerical requirement; but he said it infringed 
anyway because neither of those was important to the core invention. 
Now, it sort of follows from that, as I said, that if the first question is answered in 
favor of the patentee, it really is difficult to find a reason for why the third question will 
not be answered in the patentee’s favor as well. The presumption is switched from being 
“the patentee means what he says” to being a presumption in the opposite direction. 
It is also quite significant in Regen Lab that the doctrine of equivalents was applied 
to numerical limits. Now, I’m thinking of this in terms of my children when they were 
seventeen and a half and saying, “Why can’t I vote and why can’t I drink given that the 
limiting age is eighteen in the United Kingdom and we are equivalent to eighteen-year-
olds?” 
The world doesn’t work like that. Much like the seven-minute limit here on the 
talks that doesn’t work either, it is no longer the case for patents. 
Technetix v. Teleste is a similar case.17 The case concerned the functional and 
physical layout of electronics. The judge held that the functionality of the electronics was 
the core invention and ignored the claim features that were related to physical layout. 
Marflow Engineering v. Cassellie18 is interesting, I think, because in that case we 
had a claim for a wall mount with a locking member on the wall mount. The court held, on 
what was really an extremely narrow construction, that that wasn’t infringed literally by 
the attachment of two nuts holding the pipe in place but was infringed under the doctrine 
of equivalents.  
That has a lot in common with the latest High Court case of Emson v. Hozelock,19 
where the question was whether an inner and outer part of a hose were attached at the ends. 
They were actually attached just a couple of inches from the ends. The court held that that 
wasn’t literal infringement but was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Bearing those cases in mind, what has been the impact of the new doctrine? 
Surprisingly perhaps, there are not many cases in fact where the new doctrine has actually 
done anything to the ultimate outcome of past cases. Icescape, Regen, and Hozelock, even 
Kirin-Amgen, didn’t in the end turn on the doctrine of equivalents; they turned on the fact 
that the patents were invalid. So the result would have been the same, doctrine or no 
doctrine. 
Marflow is a case where it looks like the doctrine makes a difference, but actually 
one suspects that if there had been no doctrine of equivalents and just purposive 
construction, the purposive construction would have been broad enough to encompass the 
infringement. But this ignores two important points, which will only take about a minute 
to cover. 
The first is that cases like Technetix are being brought now and they probably 
wouldn’t have been brought in the past. The fact is that U.K. patents have broadened in 
 
16 [2019] EWHC 63 (Pat) (HHJ Hacon). 
17 [2019] EWHC 126 (IPEC) (HHJ Hacon). 
18 [2019] EWHC 410 (IPEC) (HHJ Hacon). 
19 [2019] EWHC 991 (Pat) (Nugee J). 
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scope. In the past, if you wanted to broaden your patent, you would have invalidated it and 
now you get broader scope for free. 
Second, actually the impact of these cases is not really on the reported cases; it’s 
outside of that. It is in the advice that we give to clients about their freedom to operate and 
their litigation risk. That advice has become much harder to give. It’s much woollier. 
Whenever you look at a design-around in which, obviously, people have looked at the 
limitations of the claims, it is now almost impossible to think how a design-around can be 
said to be free of any infringement risk because obviously it is trying at least in some 
respects to achieve the same result in the same way. That is the whole purpose of a design-
around. 
Design-arounds are actually part of what the patent system is meant to encourage, 
to promote innovation that works around patents. That has been made much more 
uncertain. 
I’m not saying the United Kingdom is unique in this — we are latecomers to the 
doctrine of equivalents — but I am concerned that we now might have the broadest 
infringement doctrine internationally. While that’s brilliant for nonpracticing patent 
entities, it is rather unhelpful to the encouragement of industry to come to the United 
Kingdom, and the very last thing we want to be doing right at the moment is discouraging 
investment into the United Kingdom’s manufacturing economy. 
Thank you. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Excellent. It makes sense in a presentation on equivalents that 
you’ve gone beyond the scope of your allocated seven minutes. 
Ken? 
MR. ADAMO: I’m not sure what doctrine it is that you’re using in the United 
Kingdom, but it sure as hell isn’t the doctrine of equivalents. I know you guys hate the 
doctrine of equivalents. 
So here’s my advice to people who are facing this kind of situation: hopefully 
you’ve got a United States counterpart patent, because this standard that you are going to 
have to jump through with no jury is going to be very difficult to give a clean answer to as 
far as these three-part tests go. 
In the United States the test is very simple: substantially the same function, 
substantially the same way, with substantially the same result.  
Did you hear the word “substantially” in the U.K. test? No. You are talking about 
a variation on literal infringement. 
So don’t go to the United Kingdom. You’ve got U.S. coverage. Use the United 
States or use — no, I’m being serious about this — we’re talking about how you use the 
whole world. This is how you use the whole world. 
“Insubstantial difference,” of course, is the other way the test is stated in the United 
States. It is done element by element. And guess what your big secret weapon in the United 
States is? Who decides this? Not some judge in the United Kingdom, an American jury. 
American juries, educated properly with the right expert and nice PowerPoints and stuff, 
will give you usually a good shot at it. 
So I’m sorry, I know you all hate juries, but it’s better than — if you’ve only got 
doctrine of equivalents to argue and there is the U.K. test, I think you are going to have a 
better shot going across the pond if you can do it. 
PARTICIPANT [Prof. Martin Adelman, George Washington University, 
Washington]: Ken, you know that under the same facts in Actavis the trial judge, not the 
jury, said that there was no prosecution history estoppel on a tangential theory, and 
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therefore came to the same result as Lord Neuberger. Now we’ll see what the Federal 
Circuit does. 
But what you said is not true. Actavis in the United States was decided in exactly 
the same way. So far — I’m sitting next to an Eli Lilly lawyer who may question me — 
but so far those are the facts. 
And let’s face it, Actavis was a very hard case. Even Adelman, who hates the 
doctrine of equivalents, would have applied it in that case, as the Germans did and as so 
far, the Americans have and the Dutch. 
PARTICIPANT [Prof. Robin Jacob, Former Lord Justice of Appeal of the Court 
of Appeal, London; Faculty of Laws, University College London, London]: And the 
Italians. 
MR. ADAMO: Marty, you raise a good point. The question of equivalents is a jury 
issue, but the question of prosecution history estoppel is of course an issue of law, which 
is reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit, and they can reverse it like that [snaps fingers], 
and they often do. So, please, we have a difference of a point of view, but don’t call me 
wrong unless you can back it up, all right?  
PARTICIPANT [Prof. Adelman]: There was no real question about “substantially 
the same.” It was obviously substantially the same if you looked at what they were doing. 
The only issue was an estoppel, and they had the similar estoppel in Europe. I’ll go over 
more of the facts. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Marty, thank you. This is certainly a great example of “learn, 
debate, and have fun.” 
Justin, I know you wanted to have one quick response, and then Aloys. 
DR. WATTS: It is slightly unfair to Ken because he’s facing out and can’t see the 
slides, but the word “substantially” appeared on that slide four times. 
MR. ADAMO: Then why didn’t you say “substantially” seeing you were reading 
a script, pal, which I could see? 
DR. WATTS: Because I had seven minutes; and it doesn’t make any substantial 
difference. [Laughter] 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Perform the same function in the same way to achieve the 
same result. 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: There’s also an alternative to juries, which is Klaus 
Grabinski — at the moment in Germany, hopefully at the Unified Patent Court soon. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Excellent. 
Moving right along to rock star patent policy and patent lawyer Suzanne. 
MS. MICHEL: Rock star? [Laughter] 
I am here from a company that started out in a garage and is now Google. We’ll 
change over to the other side of the pond here. I want to talk about what’s really the hot 
topic in the United States these days, which is subject matter eligibility and Section 101.20 
To give you a caveat, I’m sharing the tech perspective. I am intentionally setting 
aside the 101 Mayo21 issues around the life sciences. 
The U.S. Constitution has a goal of promoting the useful arts, and that has been 
understood in the United States to mean advances in technology, and not things like 
economic principles, legal relationships, sports plays, games, speed dating, human 
interactions, and those kinds of things. 
 
20 35 U.S. Code §101. 
21 Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).  
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Section 101 is the part of the statute that supplies that filter. I hope it would be 
noncontroversial to filter out claims like the one in Bilski,22 which was just about hedging 
without any computer component to it. Every major patent system in the world has some 
kind of technical effects test, so having that in the United States really makes us more 
consistent with the rest of the world. 
Why do we have it? Well, patents aren’t really needed to incentivize that kind of 
advancement. Other IP might also apply to these kinds of nonpatentable subject matter 
issues. 
I think a really harder question is what to do about mixed claims, those claims that 
recite what the Supreme Court has called an “abstract idea” — the things I’ve just listed — 
but also have something that looks like technology. In our space that means computer 
elements. 
It is the Alice v. CLS Bank International case23 that really grappled with that issue. 
What Alice tells us is that the mere recitation of some kind of generic component, like 
hardware, isn’t going to save the claim. That’s because it’s easy to game that kind of 
system. It would be easy to overcome the Section 101 filter by just putting in some of those 
elements and really elevating form over substance when the invention is not in fact about 
technology.  
The law has evolved since Alice a few years ago, and the Federal Circuit now 
consistently asks whether a claim recites a technological solution to a technological 
problem or a purported improvement in the relevant technology. They’re asking this 
question at both Alice Step 1 and Alice Step 2, but really in the last couple of years this 
question has been the central question in Alice Step 1. My point here is that this is really 
what the Section 101 test is now, at least when you are talking about software claims, 
computer-implemented inventions. The claim is not abstract if it recites a technological 
solution. 
That is the right question to ask for computer-implemented inventions. It aligns 
with the constitutional goal of promoting the useful arts; it supports innovation in the 
software industry; it absolutely does allow patents on software that represent technological 
advances. What it prohibits is your business method on the Internet, business method on a 
computer.  
It also aligns, like I said, the United States with what happens in a lot of the rest of 
the world and rejects the narrative that the law is in such a state of confusion that there is 
effectively no 101 test that can be articulated. 
The recent cases out of the Federal Circuit and out of the PTAB at the Patent Office 
where there have actually been dissents on this particular question — one side saying “yes 
there is a technological solution to a technological problem,” and the other side saying 
“No” — is significant because it shows decision-makers really grappling with that central 
question and tells us what questions we all ought to be grappling with. This is the way that 
we argue our own patent applications. This is the way that people are litigating on these 
issues today. 
I would say there is no evidence that having this test in this kind of line is hurting 
the software industry. The opposite is actually true — R&D investment is way up and 
venture capital investment in the software industry is up. 
If anyone’s hurt, it’s probably lawyers. They have to now carefully explain in their 
patent applications what the technological advance is, and litigation on flimsy business 
 
22 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
23 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 208 (2014).  
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method patents is no longer a really good profitable business. This is actually a good thing 
for innovation, not a bad thing. 
The main objection to this technology test that I’ve been hearing is that a lawyer 
cannot really predict with certainty what is going to fall on one side or the other. The 
proposed solution to the problem of this unpredictability from bar groups like the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association has been to effectively say “no line at all” and allow 
patents on hedging and speed dating and all of that. For sure that would be predictable, no 
line is always predictable — if we didn’t allow any validity challenges, patents would be 
super-predictable — but it is also a really bad idea; it is contrary to the goals of the patent 
system; and, again, would put the United States out of sync with the rest of the world. 
At Google what we found is that when we were writing patents pre-Alice they 
always bombed in Europe. We were having a really tough time getting past the technical 
effects test in Europe. When we started bringing in European attorneys to help us write 
those patent applications up-front for the United States in ways that would transfer over to 
Europe, we started getting our European patents. And we’ve also now been able to use that 
approach to overcome Alice rejections in the United States. My point again being that I 
think Alice has in a lot of ways reconciled some of the differences between the United 
States and Europe. 
If you accept that Section 101 has to provide some kind of filter — and I understand 
some people won’t accept that — we then have the necessity of articulating what kind of 
line that should be. Again, I think the technological solution/problem test works well. 
I really appreciate the concerns about the unpredictability. We can all point to cases 
that should have gone one way or the other and that we disagree with. Welcome to the legal 
profession. That’s just the state of what happens in our world. 
That unpredictability is due partly to the common-law practice of creating a line 
one case at a time and, maybe, partly due to different panels and different judges applying 
that test in different ways. 
But the problem is not the test itself. There are always going to be difficult cases. 
As lawyers it is our job to push at the line constantly. It’s the difficult cases that get litigated 
and those are the ones that get a lot of attention. There are cases that fall easily on one side 
of the line or the other. Those aren’t getting the attention. So the situation always looks 
worse than it really is. 
The problem with making unpredictability the end-all and be-all for this issue is 
that unpredictability exists in so many patent doctrines. The doctrine of equivalents claim 
construction is a big bugaboo I think; lots of reversals there. So really 101 is unpredictable, 
but compared to what and what are we going to do about it? 
The big question, I think, is: where do we go from here? What is the best course 
of action to get a more stable jurisprudence and more predictable line, because absolutely 
that would be very beneficial to the system and to innovation? 
I would propose that less complaining about the Supreme Court is the first step 
because it is taking a lot of time away from the conversation that we should be having, 
which is: What is technology; what is not technology — how do we want to draw this line? 
What would definitely not be helpful would be coming up with a whole new set of 
words through legislation and then spending the next ten years litigating those. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Shlomo, do you have any reaction to that? 
DR. COHEN: It seems like the world is round. The same questions come up in all 
jurisdictions all the time. We just have to remind ourselves that we’re playing a very 
delicate balancing game of costs and benefits without the data. 
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There was one scholar, Richard Posner, about thirty years ago who wrote a book 
that tried to evaluate the costs and benefits of the patent system, and he pretty much gave 
up after the book was written. 
And here we are debating one of the most serious issues in the present human 
condition — economics, politics, culture, technology, science, everything — and we don’t 
really know what the final impact of our decisions are, whether all this works to actually 
accelerate innovation; does it really encourage innovation; is it an incentive or is it not? 
We are pretty much in the dark about that. There are not enough statisticians and 
economists among us.  
PROF. MOSSOFF: Aloys. 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: If I may, two comments. 
First, I heard with pleasure that you should let your European patent attorneys draft 
your patents. That’s great. [Laughter] 
Second, I just wanted to explain. In Europe actually the technicity test is very low, 
the threshold, so almost everything is technical. The problem is that in Europe simply 
nontechnical features are not considered to be a reasonable ground for inventive step. So 
also here we see the behavior that eligibility matters are more or less disappearing, the 
threshold is very low, but in the end it is all shifted to inventive step, which has been the 
line of the European Patent Office for the last twenty years. 
In the end the outcome is you probably don’t get a patent. You don’t get a patent 
because it is not patent-eligible — it is — but it is simply not inventive. This is something 
that I wanted to clarify so that you understand it. 
MS. MICHEL: I agree with that. I didn’t go into all of that in the interest of time. 
I also really agree with your statement that in the end the outcome is the same. I 
think it is an interesting question of whether the United States should move to that kind of 
approach and move those technicity questions into the inventive step, which would be the 
obviousness analysis. I think that’s probably politically unfeasible. It would require 
opening up legislation on Section 103.24 But it’s an interesting conversation. 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: In my opinion, if I understand Mr. Iancu right, this is 
actually what he proposed. 
MS. MICHEL: I don’t think he did. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Not all of it. 
MS. MICHEL: Not the opening Section 103 inventive step part of it. 
MR. HÜTTERMANN: That’s to keep the threshold low and put it to others. 
MS. MICHEL: I think there would be resistance in the United States to a Section 
103 obviousness analysis that said, “We are not going to look at the nontechnical pieces.” 
I think that would take a change in statute; and you would then be fighting, as you do in 
Europe, about what do we take out of the inventive step analysis and what don’t we take 
out. You are shifting the fight to another place, but it is still in a lot of ways the same 
question. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Last but never least is Heinz. 
MR. GODDAR: Thank you so much. 
When the organizers and I agreed on the theme of my little presentation here, a 
certain event — i.e., “Injunctions and Flexibility in Patent Law – Civil Law and Common 
Law Perspectives,” conducted at the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich on April 4–5, 
2019, in cooperation with the German Association for Intellectual Property (GRUR)) 
 
24 35 U.S. Code §103. 
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where a British judge (Sir Richard Arnold) and a German Supreme Court judge (Dr. Klaus 
Grabinski) had a nice discussion on whether Germany permanently violates the case law 
of the ECJ by disproportionately giving remedies for cases of patent infringement. That 
inspired me even more to speak about my theme here, namely, the “wonderful world” of 
the German bifurcation system.  
Before that event in Munich on the 4th of April, actually I wanted just to find an 
excuse for the embarrassment that I always feel when my students somewhere in the world 
ask me, “Why is it that 80 percent of all patent litigation in Europe takes place in Germany 
and not in other countries?” I feel really embarrassed because they might think we (i.e. the 
German people) are a litigious people. We are not any more since 1945. [Laughter] 
Now I would just like to explain the German system, and maybe, after the end of 
these six minutes and fifty seconds, why we have this situation that I just have described. 
I would like to structure my little presentation as follows. First, where we stand in 
relation to a possible revision of that system. Second, I would like to explain the system 
first as it is; then what the pros and cons of the present system are; and, third, where we 
stand in a possible revision of that system.  
On the 20th of May, as most people here will know, there will be a governmental 
public hearing in Berlin, and the discussion is about “automatic injunction or not, and what 
do we have to change?” We will see what comes out. It is unforeseeable. I will guess today: 
nothing will come out, but we will then remain in a Brexit-induced European Patent 
Convention situation. 
In the German system we have compulsory bifurcation. We know this.  
Not in utility model litigation, by the way. Utility models are handled by the same 
district courts in Germany where patent litigation takes place, and there the court handles 
both validity and infringement questions. So this situation is not unknown to the German 
system. 
But in relation to patents we have automatic bifurcation. Automatic means: If 
somebody is attacked they are heard and handled; bifurcation means if somebody is 
attacked because of patent infringement in a patent litigation specialized court like 
Düsseldorf or Mannheim — I mention particularly these two courts; my colleagues from 
Munich and Hamburg and wherever in Germany might forgive me, but these are the most 
used ones — then the defendant’s noninfringement arguments are heard but his nonvalidity 
arguments are only indirectly heard/handled If the defendant wishes to argue validity of 
the attacking patent, he has to go to file an invalidation action at the German Federal Patent 
Court as a counterattack. He then takes a copy, so to say, of the invalidation action back to 
the judge in the patent litigation, let’s say, in Düsseldorf and says: “Your Honour” — we 
don’t say “Your Honour”; this is American TV — “Your Honour, please, I know that you 
don’t decide on validity, but please stay the litigation procedure until the invalidation court 
will have decided on validity.” 
Then, what happens? Factual situation: in only 10 percent of the patent 
infringement litigation cases filed at the Düsseldorf District Court in 2017–2018 a stay took 
place; in 90 percent of the cases no stay took place. This means the litigation procedure 
goes on, usually ending, if the plaintiff has well selected the court, in a fast-acting court 
like Düsseldorf — at the moment not so good; they need another additional chamber for 
patent disputes I believe personally — or you go to Mannheim and Munich, which is eager 
presently to become one of the most recognized German patent litigation district courts 
with an injunctional relief, namely as follows: You go there and you will get a decision 
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which ends with an immediately enforceable automatic injunction — no eBay25 situation 
in Germany, please; duly note, except in certain cases, like standard-essential patents 
(SEPs), but we leave them out of the consideration here. The plaintiff and the defendant in 
the patent litigation will end up in about one year with an immediately enforceable 
injunctional relief. That’s it. 
At that time, the invalidation case is not decided yet. Rather, it takes another one 
year and a half until the invalidation case at the Federal Patent Court will be decided. In 
this period there is an immediately enforceable injunctional relief. “I can stop you right 
away.” 
The patentee would continue: “There is a way to avoid this, of course: payment.” 
That means the patentee will “negotiate” — not restricted to Germany, but covering the 
whole of Europe, maybe even worldwide — a settlement and have a very, very valuable 
instrument in his hand — namely, to torture the defendant to death, so to say, because he 
knows the defendant, if enforcement of the injunction takes place, is out of business for 
quite a while and will suffer practically unrepairable damage in market reputation etc. 
There must be later on, of course, monetary compensation for all the losses caused, 
etc., but this is not something which prevents people from enforcing the District Court’s 
injunction immediately. In the good old times, that was not done; at least in Germany. It 
was good style to wait until the appeal decision against the injunctional relief granted by 
the District Court would have issued, and only then, i.e. after “confirmation” of the 
injunctional relief granted by the District Court by the Appeal Court, enforcement would 
have been conducted. But not nowadays; rather, the patentee will at least threaten 
immediate enforcement of the injunctional decision of the District Court. 
So the answer for my students, when they ask me why people go to Germany for 
patent litigation, I tell them it is because of this blackmailing opportunity, as I call it. 
[Laughter]. 
This opportunity is only caused by the fact that the Federal Patent Court in 
invalidation cases works so slowly. It needs two years and a half for an invalidation 
procedure, and the litigation court needs only about one year until grant of injunctional 
relief in a patent litigation case. Why is that so?  
The “official” reason is that there are not enough judges at the Federal Patent 
Court. The judges are overworked, which is a mystery to me because they get fewer and 
fewer appeal cases against the decisions of the German Patent Office because fewer and 
fewer German Patent Office decisions in national German patent cases which could go to 
appeal are made — the number of patent grants at the European Patent Office (EPO) is 
steadily increasing, but at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office is steadily decreasing. 
The number of the judges at the Federal Patent Court, however, is still the same, and 
nevertheless they seem to have less and less time to work on invalidation cases. Maybe the 
invalidation cases have just gotten more difficult. This is the problem. 
Now we have a situation where the aforementioned lack of speed of invalidation 
procedures at the Federal Patent Court should be healed. I know that also “people” in the 
German Federal Court of Justice, namely judges, say: “This must be changed. This is not 
a good system.”  
But what could we change? We must accelerate the working of the Federal Patent 
Court. I believe personally — and there are a lot of discussions going on also on the 
political level — that a possible solution might be that the Federal Patent Court at least 
 
25 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
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gives a qualified opinion, which must be given as a matter of law in an invalidation case 
well before the oral proceedings, let’s say, six months after the filing of the invalidation 
case. Then this opinion would be available to the litigation court before it makes its decision 
in the co-pending patent litigation. No stay thereof would be necessary anymore.  
I predict that if anything comes out of the present discussion in Germany, it will 
be this change of procedure — probably not by law, but by practice of the litigation as well 
as the invalidation courts. 
Thank you so much. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: I see a hand in the back. 
QUESTION [Cordula Schumacher, Arnold Ruess, Düsseldorf]: Sorry, Heinz, I 
have to disagree. I think the reason why we have a lot of patent litigation in Germany 
primarily is due to the highly experienced judges who dig into even the most complex 
cases. It is because of a streamlined court system where we don’t have discovery. It is 
because of reduced costs compared to some other countries. It is because of the experience, 
because we’ve had so many cases, so that almost any legal question has already been 
addressed in various cases. I think these are the primary reasons. 
When we are discussing the injunctions and the so-called “automatic injunction,” 
I think we have to see that we are litigating patents that have gone through a prosecution 
— so it’s not just the registered right; we have a prosecution — and in the infringement 
courts it’s not that the infringement judges do not look at validity at all; they do look at 
validity and they just estimate the chances of validity proceedings. 
I do agree on the aspect that the invalidity proceedings could be quicker, but I don’t 
think it’s that black and white and so many invalid patents get injunctions. I don’t think 
that’s the current situation. 
DR. WATTS: Could I ask Ken a follow-up to that question? Did people go to the 
Marshall District of Texas because of its experienced judges and the lack of discovery, or 
was it for another reason? [Laughter] 
MR. ADAMO: This is going to probably surprise you. In the last two years 
defendants — being accused infringers — have won more often in Marshall, Texas than 
plaintiffs. This is not unusual. 
People went there over the last five years — and I’m not only admitted to the State 
Bar of Texas, but I am admitted to the Eastern District of Texas, and I think between Justin 
and I, I’m the only one who has ever tried a case there. 
These people don’t just write big checks for people because they’ve got U.S. 
patents. These are jurors like anywhere else. They understand the law and they apply the 
law. 
The Federal Circuit is always there if a stay is made of a judgment while the appeal 
is going on to handle this. 
If you look at the judges — it’s like why do people go to the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC)? Who tries more cases in the United States — in the world; I’m 
sorry, maybe even more than Düsseldorf — really tries them, than ITC judges? Nobody. 
Who tries more cases in the United States to verdict than the judges in the Eastern 
District of Texas? I could probably pick Judge Stark in Delaware; Judge Lynn in Northern 
Texas, no. They are very experienced judges. They do rule fairly. They now handle 
summary judgments, which in the old days they didn’t. But that’s the main reason they 
went out there. 
You know which is the most patent-favorable “over the years” district in the United 
States, awards the biggest jury verdicts on average? Delaware — not East Texas, Delaware 
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— and they don’t even know the difference between the singular and plural of y’all in 
Delaware. [Laughter]  
Oh, you guys didn’t know there was a plural of y’all? I’ll tell you later. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Shlomo wants to say something, and then Heinz. 
DR. COHEN: Ken, like all of us non-Americans who hear about jury trials in 
complicated patent cases, I’m very bewildered, and I’m always reminded of the comedian 
who talked about the O.J. Simpson trial and spoke about “a jury who had to decide on DNA 
where most of them didn’t get that far in the alphabet.” [Laughter] 
MR. ADAMO: Shlomo, remember this all gets transcribed. It never goes away. 
DR. COHEN: That’s the Google issue. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: Heinz? 
DR. COHEN: That was just the preamble. 
The real point again is to remind ourselves that these are the same issues that come 
up again and again. The question now is have patent holders exceeded or exaggerated their 
power, which resulted in an anti-IP campaign, which resulted in the eBay decision in the 
United States where injunctive relief, which we all thought was the most automatic relief 
remedy in a patent infringement case, is no longer the case. And you can track it back to 
other events, like pharmaceutical companies and AIDS patents in Africa or many other 
questions. This is a very delicate, never-ending balancing game. 
MR. GODDAR: One comment: I would fully agree with what Cordula 
Schumacher said, and I can give a nice speech on all the advantages of the German system. 
But I fear a little bit that what I talked about here, my very personal opinion, is the driving 
force which drives the cases into Germany. 
QUESTION [Joachim Feldges, Allen & Overy, Munich]: Actually we are now in 
the situation in Germany where we get final judgments on infringement a year before there 
is the first hearing on validity. That is a constitutional concern. The right to be heard is 
disregarded, and that needs to be fixed. There is no debate about that. 
So this is an issue, and for good reasons Germany was not strongly fighting in the 
Unified Patent Court to introduce their system there for good reason and experience. That 
is definitely now at the stage where we need to fix it. 
PROF. MOSSOFF: I’m going to take one more question and then we’ll break for 
lunch. 
QUESTION [Jürgen Dressel, formerly with Novartis, Basel]: I certainly would 
agree with Heinz, also due to our past experience in European litigation, that there is a huge 
blackmailing potential in this bifurcation and in the time difference between the 
infringement and the invalidation decisions. 
I would add to what you said that it is not just the proceedings of the Federal Patent 
Court which are slow. The other issue is that in Germany while European Patent Office 
opposition proceedings are still ongoing you cannot actually start a national invalidation 
action. At least in the past, the European Patent Office was extremely slow. They are 
improving a little bit, but I think this is still an issue. I am wondering whether this practice 
can be changed easily or is cast in law and can actually be changed.  
PARTICIPANT [ Klaus Grabinski, Federal Court of Justice]: It is the law. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Dressel]: It is cast in law so it cannot be changed easily, okay. 
MR. ADAMO: I have one quick point, and I’m not suggesting this is a solution to 
the problem. Anti-suit injunctions have become very popular in the United States, for all 
sorts of reasons, and people can get very creative about those. You will find judges in the 
United States, if they’ve got personal jurisdiction over you, can stop you from doing 
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something in Germany unless you want to go to jail in the United States. (I’m overstating 
that, obviously, about the jail.) 
PROF. MOSSOFF: I want to thank our audience and thank our panelists and 
presenters. It was wonderfully substantive, fun, and very sweet-smelling. 
